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ABSTRACT
Health information technology (IT) offers exciting opportunities for providing novel 
services to patients, and for improving the quality and safety of care. Many health-
care professionals are already improving services through the development of 
numerous bottom-up local health IT innovations. Such innovations from the ground 
up are to be welcomed, but healthcare providers are struggling to develop pro-
cesses for managing the risks that come with the introduction of health IT into 
clinical processes. I argue that too often the main strategy appears to be one of 
organisational ignorance. This puts patients at risk, and it threatens the successful 
adoption of health IT. I recommend that healthcare providers focus on strengthen-
ing their processes for organisational learning, promoting proactive risk manage-
ment strategies, and making risk management decisions transparent and explicit.
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INTRODUCTION
Health systems, in the United Kingdom and worldwide, are 
going digital. Healthcare providers need to ensure that they 
harness the ‘information revolution’ to provide better health 
outcomes, better patient experience and better value.1 While 
national policy is concerned to a large extent with major infor-
mation technology (IT) programmes, such as the widespread 
introduction of Electronic Health Records (EHRs), many 
healthcare professionals are already improving their services 
through development of numerous bottom-up local health IT 
innovations. Healthcare providers need to be mindful of the 
potential risks to patient safety that come with the introduc-
tion of new IT into clinical practice, but many organisations 
are struggling to find the right strategy to engage adequately 
with such bottom-up small-scale innovations.
The recent Wachter review2 and other influential reports 
published by The King’s Fund3 and the Nuffield Trust4 set 
out a strategy and recommendations for the transformation 
of the National Health Service (NHS) towards a fully digitised 
and interoperable health system. It is expected that the digi-
tal infrastructure will be a key mechanism for delivering the 
vision set out in the NHS 5-year forward view for a modern 
health service.1 Indeed, health IT offers exciting opportuni-
ties for providing novel services to patients, and for improving 
the quality and safety of care.2,5 Experiences from several 
countries illustrate the wide range of potential benefits that 
IT can bring to healthcare, including: more engaging and 
patient-centred care, better access to care in rural and under-
served areas, greater continuity of care across organisational 
boundaries, efficiency gains and cost savings.2,6
However, there is still a lively debate about the extent to 
which the available evidence supports the claims about the 
benefits of IT in healthcare.7–9 In addition, there is an increas-
ing amount of evidence to suggest that the introduction of IT 
can lead to unintended consequences, and create opportuni-
ties for failure, which can have significant effects on patient 
safety and data security.6,10–14 For example, concerns about 
the quality and safety of care have recently sparked contro-
versy about the Cerner EHR system iHealth introduced in 
2016 by Island Health at Nanaimo Regional General Hospital 
(British Columbia). After a series of problems and failures, 
some staff refused to use the system and decided to go back 
to pen and paper to protect the safety of patients.15
The Wachter review recognises that the NHS lacks clini-
cians with skills in digital health and health informatics. In 
response, the government set up the NHS Digital Academy 
with a brief to train significant numbers of clinicians to 
become suitably qualified Chief Clinical Information Officers 
(CCIO). Such CCIOs are set to become the champions and 
the leaders of local digital transformation.16 This is an impor-
tant step forward, because it recognises that technological 
change needs to be carried by changes in the workforce and 
the culture within every organisation. 
A further important observation made in the Wachter review 
is the need to allow for local variation in order to avoid the pit-
falls of a centralised top-down approach, which formed the 
basis of the previous, much criticised National Programme 
for IT. From a patient safety perspective, I believe this is cru-
cial for two reasons: first, because patient safety risks need to 
be understood and managed within the local context of use of 
any technology;17,18 and second, because much of the digital 
innovation is driven from the ground up by enthusiastic clini-
cians aiming to improve care within their local context. 
Many healthcare providers are struggling to fully embrace 
the opportunities afforded by health IT, and to develop pro-
cesses for managing the risks that come with the introduction 
of health IT into clinical processes. In this paper, I look at how 
healthcare providers might manage the risks of health IT in 
use, with a particular view to local bottom-up innovations. I 
argue that many of the patient safety risks relating to health 
IT are probably quite predictable, but all too often healthcare 
providers do not properly consider potential risks, and leave 
these unaddressed. This puts patients at risk, and it threatens 
the successful adoption of health IT. I draw upon experiences 
from a number of projects funded by the Health Foundation to 
outline three key recommendations for how healthcare pro-
viders might better manage their health IT risks.
INNOVATION UNDER THE RADAR
I believe that it is useful to consider the different ways in 
which health IT innovations are introduced into clinical prac-
tice, because in this way we can determine the gaps that 
exist in current organisational risk management practice. On 
the one hand, there are large national- and organisation-wide 
projects, where expensive third-party health IT systems are 
introduced throughout an organisation or even throughout a 
health system. An example is the introduction of EHRs such 
as iHealth. Manufacturers of such systems are expected to 
have robust quality and safety assurance processes in place. 
Healthcare providers make purchasing decisions through pro-
curement committees. These committees usually place great 
reliance on manufacturers to build ‘safe’ systems, and they 
look for quality standards such as the European Conformité 
Européene marking.19 While this is not unreasonable, there 
are plenty of examples that suggest that this in itself is not 
sufficient to ensure that technology is safe when used in clini-
cal practice.18,20,21 This is because the local context of use, 
and the procedures and infrastructures in place can have a 
significant impact on patient safety.22
There is another form in which digital innovations rapidly 
transform health services, however, and this is talked about 
much less, and is seriously under-researched. On a site visit, 
I talked to a consultant in acute care, who demonstrated to 
me an electronic handover tool that his team has developed. 
The clinical team had experienced problems with poor hando-
ver, missing data and inappropriately prioritised patients. The 
team felt that these problems resulted, to a large extent, from 
the ad-hoc use of non-standardised (i.e. random) pieces 
of paper during handover. The electronic handover tool 
addresses this issue by providing a standardised approach, 
and it displays real-time data (e.g. recent observations) as 
well as a red-amber-green classification to indicate patient 
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acuity. From problem identification to tool development and 
deployment in clinical practice, this innovation project was 
entirely a local effort driven exclusively by the enthusiasm of 
the clinical team.
In the NHS, and in health services worldwide, there are 
many more such examples, where enthusiastic clinicians and 
healthcare professionals drive local bottom-up health IT inno-
vations in order to provide more accessible, more patient-
centred, and better services to their patients. The breadth of 
examples spans almost all clinical processes, and includes 
innovations such as locally developed electronic and mobile 
handover tools, electronic observation tools to support com-
pliance with Early Warning Score assessments, mobile bed 
management tools, mobile patient referrals, electronic sepsis 
screening tools, web portals offering advice to patients with 
long-term conditions, clinician-led chat rooms for patients, vir-
tual counselling and mobile phone apps that support patients 
with mental health conditions. The local digital innovation 
potential within the health service appears limitless, and for 
the most part they are great ideas that can improve patient 
care. But what about the safety risks to patients?
While such innovations are to be welcomed, they fre-
quently occur somewhat ‘under the radar’ of organisational 
risk management and governance processes. The reasons 
for this can be manifold. The perceived bureaucracy might 
put off clinicians. For example, a clinician setting up a patient 
portal might use an outside server to host the service – and 
they might perceive that aligning this with organisational 
information governance procedures would be a lengthy pro-
cess with uncertain outcome. In other situations, healthcare 
professionals might fear that innovations would never get off 
ground if they had to cut through all of the organisational red 
tape. Other reasons might be a strong focus on the expected 
benefits, which blinds to potential risks, or simply a lack of 
awareness that relevant organisational processes exist. In 
the case of the electronic handover tool referred to above, the 
clinical team initially regarded their innovation as part of their 
everyday quality improvement efforts, and only later started 
to embed this within the wider, more formalised organisa-
tional quality improvement initiatives.
I believe there is much value to these bottom-up initiatives. 
However, the downside is that organisations are not aware of 
the various local improvement efforts that are going on, and 
that these improvement efforts might not draw on relevant 
quality improvement and safety management expertise.23 As 
a result, potential patient safety risks might not be properly 
thought through, and in some instances patients could be 
harmed.
THE RISKS SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED
In safety engineering, risk is often described in terms of the 
likelihood of an event occurring, and the severity of the asso-
ciated consequences. In safety-critical industries, much effort 
goes into predicting and preventing the so-called high-sever-
ity, low-frequency events, that is, the rare, but potentially cat-
astrophic accident scenarios. Of course, such events have 
to be understood and prevented in healthcare, too, as tragic 
cases repeatedly demonstrate.18,24 However, equally rele-
vant in a healthcare context are risks that have relatively high 
likelihood of occurrence but maybe only moderate severity 
of consequences.25 These are events that happen relatively 
often and cause minor or moderate harm, such as many pre-
scribing errors.26 Because such medium-level risks are com-
mon occurrences, they are predictable and understandable, 
and improvements or countermeasures can be put in place.
I would argue that, similarly, many of the health IT risks 
arise from very common types of hazards that might be antic-
ipated and assessed readily. Consider, for example, the fast-
growing domain of medical apps.27 Although the technology 
is relatively new in a health context, many of the risks are not, 
for example, the information stored in apps does not currently 
transfer easily to electronic patient records – this can result in 
gaps in documentation and potentially conflicting or contra-
dictory advice being given; the advice provided by apps could 
be inaccurate or misleading – patients might suffer harm from 
wrong drug dose adjustments or inadequate drug frequen-
cies; and apps run on mobile devices, which might be lost or 
stolen – sensitive patient information might be inadvertently 
disclosed. I suspect that such risks are hardly surprising to 
clinicians. Many clinicians will have experienced similar prob-
lems in other contexts, such as gaps in documentation due to 
poor communication and handover.28
So, if many risks are predictable, can patients expect to be 
protected? Too often, the organisational strategy of dealing 
with such bottom-up innovations under the radar of organisa-
tional governance frameworks appears to be one of organ-
isational ignorance, pretended or real: patient safety risks 
are ignored at the organisational level, and innovations are 
assumed to be safe until proven otherwise. Then, following an 
incident or an adverse event, the organisational risk manage-
ment and governance machinery springs into action.29 All too 
often the end result is that individual clinicians are blamed, 
but deeper learning about the organisational processes and 
structures is rare.30,31
Healthcare providers need to foster bottom-up health IT 
innovations, and provide an organisational structure to man-
age effectively any patient safety risks.
RECOMMENDATION 1: FOCUS ON 
ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING
Healthcare providers need to focus on strengthening their 
processes for organisational learning.32 The importance of 
organisational learning for improving patient safety has been 
highlighted many times.33,34 Following the Mid Staffordshire 
inquiry, the Berwick report called for the NHS to become a 
system devoted to continuous learning and improvement.35 
Effective organisational learning can be hard to achieve in 
practice, and the barriers to organisational learning have been 
documented in the literature.36–38 The review of the introduc-
tion of the iHealth EHR found that staff, who had been initially 
very supportive, were disappointed and frustrated because 
their concerns had not been taken seriously, there was little in 
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terms of feedback and improvements, and staff were blamed 
for mistakes in the use of iHealth.39
It is widely recognised that the introduction of IT into 
work processes, clinical and otherwise, can cause disrup-
tion to existing work practices.40 Organisations are depen-
dent, therefore, on feedback from staff who engage with 
the technology, and who are able to provide valuable infor-
mation about weaknesses and inadequacies of electronic 
systems. For staff to feel comfortable providing such informa-
tion, healthcare providers need to ensure that they foster an 
open and just culture, where staff reporting incidents are not 
blamed.41
Healthcare organisations also need to acknowledge that 
deviations from planned procedures and protocols do not 
necessarily represent ‘violations’.42 Healthcare is a com-
plex system that relies on local adaptations by healthcare 
professionals to provide the resilience necessary to deal 
with changing demands, disruptions and surprises.43,44 
Healthcare organisations can utilise different instruments to 
tap into this important information about local adaptations. 
Examples include adaptation-reporting schemes,45,46 learn-
ing from excellence reporting47 and supporting informal 
learning in communities of practice.48
RECOMMENDATION 2: PROMOTE 
PROACTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT
Healthcare providers need to develop and promote proactive 
risk management strategies, which are best practice in other 
safety-critical industries.49,50 Patients have a right to expect 
that healthcare providers have thought systematically and 
thoroughly about patient safety risks before a system is intro-
duced. However, the capacity for the proactive identification 
and mitigation of technology-related risks is underdeveloped 
or lacking in many healthcare organisations.51–53
Methods and techniques for the proactive identification 
of risk in healthcare exist, even if most of them come with 
limitations.54,55 The most frequently used prospective haz-
ard analysis technique is failure mode and effects analysis 
(FMEA), for which a healthcare specific version (Healthcare 
FMEA) has been developed.56 FMEA and its variants have 
been used, for example, to analyse organ procurement and 
transplantation, patient handover in emergency care and 
intravenous drug infusions.57–59 More recently, human reli-
ability analysis techniques, such as systematic human error 
reduction and prevention approach, have been used to anal-
yse drug prescription and administration in hospital, primary 
care and community settings.60–62 However, such methods 
are used still only infrequently, and often those who drive bot-
tom-up health IT innovations do not know them.14 There is a 
need to provide greater awareness and education about the 
existence and possible use of such techniques, along with 
the recognition of their limitations.
One might argue that to a certain extent this extends also 
to regulatory bodies. While there is a strong regulatory focus 
on counting harms (e.g. through the NHS patient safety ther-
mometer), there are few regulatory incentives for healthcare 
providers to systematically identify and to reduce patient 
safety risks proactively. This requires funding and an ade-
quate knowledge base to enable assessors and inspectors to 
look for appropriate evidence and to ask the right questions.
RECOMMENDATION 3: MAKE RISK 
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS TRANSPARENT 
AND EXPLICIT
Healthcare providers should make decisions about risks, risk 
reduction and risk acceptance explicitly and transparently.63 
This is not to suggest that all risks should be eliminated, but 
patients should expect that healthcare providers be in a posi-
tion to describe their patient safety risks, and to justify why 
these are thought to be acceptable. 
Again, this is best practice in UK safety-critical industries 
as well as in several other countries. Before and during the 
introduction of a new system or major changes to existing 
practices, organisations document the risks they have iden-
tified, the risk reduction measures they have implemented, 
and the justification for why the residual risk is thought to 
be acceptable in a report referred to as safety case.64 The 
safety case can be critiqued both internally and externally, 
and it can provide assurance that risks have been considered 
appropriately.
NHS Digital standards SCCI 012965 and SCCI 016066 for 
the management of risk in the manufacture and use of health 
IT explicitly require the development of such a clinical safety 
case modelled after industrial practice. However, awareness 
of these standards appears not widespread among health-
care professionals implementing health IT innovations. In 
addition, the regulatory landscape is still evolving, and there 
is uncertainty and confusion about the regulatory status of 
many health IT products.67–69
CONCLUSION
We are seeing many exciting bottom-up, local health IT inno-
vations being developed and adopted to improve patient 
care. Healthcare providers need to encourage bottom-up 
health IT innovations, but also provide frameworks to ensure 
that patients remain safe. This requires active engagement 
with local innovations, and proactive consideration of patient 
safety risks. Thinking about risks proactively does not inhibit 
innovation, but instead supports the adoption and spread of 
useful technologies that are safe.
Methods and frameworks for understanding and manag-
ing health IT risks exist, and healthcare providers should not 
ignore the patient safety risks that might come with the intro-
duction of health IT. A key challenge appears to be the cur-
rent lack of awareness and safety management knowledge 
among both organisations and healthcare professionals. In 
response to the suggestions made in the Wachter review, 
government policy focuses on the education of clinicians to 
become CCIOs, who can champion and lead health IT inno-
vations. The extent to which this includes aspects of patient 
safety and risk management is not yet clear. Arguably, it might 
Journal of Innovation in Health Informatics Vol 25, No 1 (2018)
Sujan Managing the patient safety risks of bottom-up health information technology innovations: recommendations for healthcare providers 11
be unreasonable to expect clinicians to become experts in 
all aspects of technological change. A complementary strat-
egy might be to consider the more widespread training and 
deployment of clinical safety engineers and safety profes-
sionals within healthcare providers.
The introduction of health IT into clinical practice, both bot-
tom-up and organisation-wide, needs to be underpinned by 
a strong commitment to organisational learning. Healthcare 
professionals experience the problems with health IT on a 
daily basis. They are not responsible for these problems, and 
they can provide valuable insights into how the technology 
can be improved. Healthcare providers need to resist the 
temptation of blaming staff, and invest in formal and informal 
processes for learning and improving from staff feedback.
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